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Welcome to the Autumn 2015 issue of Network Industries 
Quarterly! This issue is dedicated to some of the best pa-
pers presented at the 4th Conference on the Regulation of 
Infrastructures, which was organized by the Florence School of 
Regulation in June 2015. Selected academics and practitioners 
have been invited to Florence to discuss the latest developments 
in the regulation of different network industries, namely trans-
port, energy, telecoms and water distribution around the world. 
Both the Conference and this issue of the Network Industries 
Quarterly have a special focus on emerging countries. Hence, 
this issue follows the path started by the Spring issue of the 
NIQ and extends the scope of the regulatory analysis to the 
emerging countries. 
The first article (Joe Tomain) brings a picture of the US and 
the historic transformation of the US energy policy. In particu-
lar, the paper focuses on the Clean Power Plan, which is mer-
ging energy and environmental regulation for the first time for 
the express purpose of combating climate change.
Ricardo Reis, Joaquim Sarmento and Joao Goncalves make 
an assessment of water utilities efficiency using the Portuguese 
case. This paper helps to better understand the water sector in 
Portugal and provides solid evidence that there is room the dif-
ferent models of concessions: PPP, state-owned companies or 
government run services.
The third article (Christian Jaag, Urs Trinkner, Jose Parra 
Moyano) focuses on the major challenges and opportunities 
for postal service providers. It analyses the specific regulatory 
context in which postal strategies are derived, links it to the 
behavior and performance of incumbent operators, and com-
pares the performance of these public operators deriving gene-
ric strategies of proven success.
In the fourth article, Edson Gonçalves and Patrícia Sampaio 
present the railway privatization process currently undertaken 
in Brazil. The Brazilian situation is very peculiar as every region 
has developed its railway system independently. Also, at present 
technical differences basically prevent competition and open 
access. Furthermore, the weak position of the national regu-
latory agency as well as the unique role of Valec (state owned 
company) make this case very interesting and highly debated. 
The fifth article (Riham Ahmed Ezzat, Carlo Cambini, 
Carine Staropoli) looks at 17 Middle East North African 
(MENA) Countries along a period of 16 years (1995-2010), 
enquiring whether regulatory reform sequences matter for 
telecom sectors performances. This paper was awarded as best 
paper at the Conference.
We hope that you find these contributions interesting and 
we are looking forward to the next edition of the Conference 
on the Regulation of Infrastructures in June 2016! 
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The US electric industry is currently facing two substan-
tial challenges. First, the transmission system is in disrepair 
and in need of multi-trillion dollar investments and must 
evolve into the promised smart grid. Second, the gene-
ration segment is now being called to task for its carbon 
emissions and may be subject to historically significant 
federal regulations intended to address climate change, 
which is addressed in this paper.
In June 2014, the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) issued a proposed rule to curb 
carbon dioxide emissions from existing generating units 
(EGUs) known as the Clean Power Plan (CPP). While 
the final rule is expected August 20151, compliance is not 
expected to begin until 2016 at the earliest and may be 
extended, for multi-state plans, to 2018. 
The CPP is a watershed proposal because it begins to 
align energy and environmental regulation at the natio-
nal level. Historically, energy and the environment have 
been regulated by separate agencies and driven by separate 
regulatory goals. While several individual states have been 
more aggressive in addressing climate change, until this 
rule the federal government has failed to address climate 
change to any significant degree. Unsurprisingly, those 
regulations are subject to legal challenge and the final out-
come of whether or not those rules satisfy legal require-
ments will not be known for years. 
1. The Clean Power Plan and Future US Energy Policy
The best way to integrate energy and the environment is 
through climate change regulation. In the US, efforts to 
adopt a national policy on climate change have remained 
largely unrealized, even as state and regional efforts have 
progressed. Sub-national activities on this front include 
a widespread, if uneven, adoption of renewable portfolio 
standards by over 37 states; regional and multi-state arran-
gements to curb carbon emissions; and individual state 
efforts, such as those in California, to regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions and those in New York to restructure the 
electricity sector. Nevertheless, federal action to link ener-
gy and the environment more closely is beginning to occur 
and instead of waiting for federal climate legislation, the 
Obama administration has chosen to act administratively.
The CPP is intended to use federal-state cooperation 
to develop state-based plans to reduce carbon emissions by 
26% (below 2005 levels) by 2020 and by 30% by 2030. 
The EPA estimates that the total combined climate and 
health benefits range from $26 billion to $57 billion in 
2020 and from $55 billion to $93 billion in 2030. These 
benefits include reduced risks from heat stroke, reduced 
heat-related deaths, and reduced particulate pollution, as 
well as the costs incident to a decrease in the intensity of 
extreme weather events. Further, the agency estimates that 
the health and climate benefits will outweigh the estima-
ted annual cost of meeting the standards, which are pro-
jected to run from $7.3 billion to $8.8 billion in 2030.
From 2020 to 2029 each state must meet a certain 
annual average amount of pollution reduction during that 
period. After this interim period, states must then meet 
EPA’s 2030 target for emission reductions, and continue 
to do so from that point onward. State goals will be tethe-
red to EPA’s calculation of the “best system of emissions 
reduction” (BSER). 
The BSER will be calculated based upon the mix of 
the power resources in each state and the application of 
four “building blocks” to achieve reduction targets. The 
building blocks are: (1) increasing the efficiency of fossil 
fuel-fired power plants through heat-rate improvements, 
including retiring older, less efficient coal plants; (2) using 
lower emitting energy resources such as natural gas; (3) 
utilizing more zero or low-carbon energy sources such as 
renewable energy or nuclear power; and (4) using electri-
city more efficiently through, for example, demand-side 
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management programs and more efficient transmission 
systems. 
Building Block 1 seeks heat rate improvements by 
EGUs by a state average of 6%. By increasing the heat 
rate - that is, by adopting improvements that increase the 
efficiency with which an EGU converts fuel to electricity – 
carbon intensity can be reduced by increasing the heat rate 
through decreasing the amount of fuel needed to produce 
the same amount of electricity. These improvements can 
be realized through such measures as equipment upgrades 
and by further optimizing operational practices.
Building Block 2 aims to modify fleet composition and 
dispatch practices by encouraging EGUs that are carbon-
heavy to switch to less carbon-intensive generation. The 
CPP encourages EGUs to stop using the existing practice 
of first dispatching least-cost, carbon-heavy (i.e. coal) re-
sources to generate electricity. Much of this change may 
come from increased reliance on natural gas-fired units, 
and particularly natural gas combined cycle units. EGUs 
may also choose to dispatch larger amounts of solar and 
wind power. 
Building Block 3 also promotes greater use of lower-
carbon generation. In particular, Building Block 3 
contemplates greater use of renewable generating capa-
city. Renewable electricity, including conventional hydro-
power, currently constitutes 12% of total US electricity 
generation. The CPP’s suggested expansion of renewable 
resources should be aided by the fact that more than half 
of the states have developed renewable portfolio standards, 
which require utilities to sell a certain percentage of elec-
tricity from renewable resources.
The CPP also envisions nuclear power as a key part 
of this building block. Nuclear power can reduce carbon 
intensity either through building new nuclear units (five 
are currently under constructions) or maintaining exis-
ting units rather than retiring them. This preservation 
may include plant upgrades as well as operating license 
extensions.
Building Block 4 offers credit for increasing energy 
efficiency. By reducing demand for generation at the affec-
ted EGUs, emissions reductions will occur. Forty-seven 
states have established demand-side energy efficiency poli-
cies and, therefore, the CPP can increase their utilization. 
States can proceed individually or in collaboration 
via multi-state or regional plans. State compliance will 
be accomplished through two general approaches: direct 
regulation of EGUs, known as inside the fence line regu-
lation; and, beyond the fence line regulations that affect 
non-EGU power providers such as wind, solar, and energy 
efficiency firms. The CPP, thus, is directed not only at 
EGUs but at states’ provision of electricity more broadly.
The electric industry has not embraced the CPP and 
has argued that such regulatory requirements are injurious 
for two basic reasons. First, it argues that as a result of 
the availability of non-utility electricity, particularly from 
distributed generation, that privately-don’t electric utilities 
will soon be in the throes of a “death spiral.” Second, the 
imposition of further regulations, particularly those ad-
dressing carbon emissions, threatens the reliability of the 
entire electric system. 
Neither the death spiral nor the reliability argument is 
sound. The electric utility industry is not near entering a 
death spiral. At present, less than 2% of electricity is pro-
vided by non-utility distributed generation. Consequently, 
claims of financial exigency are overstated. Claims about 
reliability, likewise, are not based on solid evidence and are 
likewise overstated. Instead of retarding economic growth, 
the CPP presents opportunities for business and regula-
tory innovation as traditionally structured utilities reorient 
their business practices. More specifically, through ratema-
king, regulators can encourage: (1) technological innova-
tion; (2) investments in renewable resources and energy 
efficiency; and, (3) grid improvements and upgrades. 
2. Merging Energy and the Environment
Two significant consequences follow from linking energy 
and the environment. First, a clean energy policy can be 
advanced. Second, the energy future is now linked to cli-
mate change. It can be argued, easily enough, that a clean 
energy future is valuable in and of itself. Nevertheless, ali-
gning climate change and clean energy promises a better 
future. 
Assume, then, that a merger of energy and environ-
mental policy is a wise step to take. Assume further, that 
a clean energy future is not only promising, it is desirable. 
Those assumptions then raise two significant questions. 
First, what political strategies should be engaged to achieve 
this promising future? While the strategic political ques-
tion is a necessary one, another political question precedes 
it: What new narrative does the merger between energy 
and the environment need to justify itself? If we can begin 
to describe that narrative, then it should lead us to the 
appropriate political strategies. 
The essence of the argument is that a new energy/envi-
ronmental politics is necessary and appropriate because 
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the traditional energy narrative is stale. The traditional 
narrative promoted the expansion of large-scale, centra-
lized fossil fuel energy. Cheap, but dirty, fossil fuel energy 
has played a significant role in contributing to economic 
growth and to the political authority of the US for most of 
the 20th century. In the 21st century, however, traditional 
energy policy has proven to be seriously flawed precisely 
because of the unaccounted for social costs of fossil fuel 
energy. 
Today, instead of centralized power, decentralized, 
smaller-scale, consumer friendly energy strategies are nee-
ded for the transition to a clean energy economy. More 
decentralized energy/environmental action is directly lin-
ked with democracy as political activities directly affect 
the localized an individual production and consumption 
of energy.
More democratic and decentralized energy/environ-
mental action is a reality not only a possibility. By enga-
ging in such activities such as 350.org and voluntary 
carbon action reduction groups, individual behavior is 
changing as energy consumers reorient their political lives 
from energy consumerism to democratic energy participa-
tion. In short, a prosumer society is developing. Proactive 
involvement with the energy/environmental complex at 
the local and individual levels is a significant change in 
thinking and acting about the future. Individual actions 
today do not count as short-term economic losses through 
reduced consumption or by paying the costs of environ-
mental adaptation or mitigation, instead active participa-
tion is viewed as a gain in greater democracy and consu-
mer control. 
How, though, does a more democratic clean energy 
politics connect with democracy? The central democratic 
principle is to promote greater participation and voice in 
political and economic institutions. As such, a new, more 
democratic energy/environmental paradigm affects (1) the 
production and delivery of energy; (2) its consumption 
and control; (3) its regulation and enforcement; and, (4) 
its governance and legal institutions. In short, energy law, 
policy and decision-making move in two more democratic 
directions. First, they move from top to bottom. Under 
the guidance of the federal government, states and local 
governments, as well as consumers, will play an increa-
sing role in combating climate change. Second, they move 
focus from central power production to decentralized 
consumption. Under the CPP, prosumers have a larger say 
in not only consumption but also in the production of 
energy. 
A smarter, cleaner energy politics leads to smarter, clea-
ner energy/environmental technologies. Decentralized, 
small-scale, labor-intensive clean energy industries and 
activities offer a competitive advantage by stimulating 
jobs, innovations and investments. Further, energy decen-
tralization enables states and local governments to serve 
as “policy laboratories” that engage in regulatory experi-
mentation, which can promote efficiency gains through 
competition; develop best practices for the local use and 
distribution of energy; engage in public education through 
the accumulation and dissemination of local knowledge; 
enable localities to scale energy activities to the tasks most 
suitable to them; and, search for cooperative solutions 
with and among other layers of government.
Through all of these processes, citizen participation is 
heightened as citizens choose new political ends, in this 
case, an integrated energy/environmental future. Such is 
the democratic impulse. As distributed generation, decen-
tralization and small-scale energy technologies expand, 
utilities will respond as consumers play a more participa-
tory role in signaling to utilities their demand for energy 
and energy-related services as well as their ability to gene-
rate their own power and control their own consumption. 
Likewise, regulators will be called upon to better manage 
the energy system by balancing new consumer demands 
with new utility structures. In short, a new and more 
democratic regulatory framework will develop to support 
planning, coordination and innovation as a new politics 
takes hold.
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1. Introduction
This article builds on the Portuguese1  experience in the 
water sector. We analyse the financial efficiency, the quali-
ty of the service and overall performance of the Portuguese 
water distribution system and how variables such as impact 
of private management, scale, productivity and contracts 
affect performance.
The Portuguese setting is particularly interesting for 
three sets of reasons: first, it is the result of an extremely fast 
development to fulfil EU requirements.  It has compensa-
ted in just a decade and a half the lack of infrastructure 
in water supply, waste water and waste treatment existing 
before. Despite some concerns, this fast pace was achie-
ved with a reasonable efficiency in the services. Second, 
the setting is very neatly organized around a centralized 
regulator and central overreaching water company (“Aguas 
de Portugal”) with regional wholesalers of water services 
and local retailers. Third, it allows for the existence of nu-
merous settings, with corporations that may be public or 
private, national or international, vertically integrated or 
horizontally integrated. At the end, in a very controlled 
setting, we can observe a myriad of cases that conveniently 
allow the type of statistical analysis we are developing here.
2. The Portuguese water utilities sector
The water sector in Portugal comprises three different sub-
sectors: the distribution of water to the public; the wastewa-
ter system; and the waste management services. All three 
sub-sectors have a chain of processes. These processes are 
divided into the “upstream” wholesaler of regional water 
services (eg: abstraction of water for further consumption 
from a watershed that will serve many municipalities) and 
the “downstream” local stages (eg: distribution of water to 
households within a city).
In Portugal there are three models of management of 
companies in the water sector: 1) Direct state management, 
which means that local or “inter-municipal” governmental 
providers take responsibility for the service; 2) Delegation, 
where a state-owned company provides the services; 3) 
Concession, which allows for the entrance of private com-
panies. These companies can be state-owned companies 
or privately owned (private majority or minority share-
holders). When the company is mostly privately owned, 
the concession is considered a Public-Private Partnership 
(PPP). Concessions can be municipal or multi-municipal. 
In order to comply with EU infrastructure require-
ments and to take advantage of European (co-)funding 
opportunities, Portugal engaged in a frantic expansion of 
the water system infrastructures from the start of the cen-
tury. In 2000 an objective was established: over a period 
of 6 years the infrastructure was bound to meet the top 
European standards assuring a level of water supply service 
to 95% of the population and of wastewater infrastructure 
to 90% of the population. These goals were reached and 
surpassed for urban populations, but rural areas are still 
lagging behind As pointed out by Cruz & Marques (2012), 
the challenge in the water sector has passed from exten-
ding coverage to upgrading efficiency and performance.
This expansion has allowed the country to assure wa-
ter supply to almost all its population, especially in ur-
ban areas. Also, water quality has improved significantly. 
In 1993 only 50% of the domestic water supplied was 
considered safe, whereas within less than a generation, in 
2011, that number climbed to 98% (RASAARP 2012). 
Naturally this rapid growth was only possible thanks to 
a massive investment. However, such an expansion has 
raised questions on the quality and efficiency in the use of 
public funding and resources.
Similar expansion was experienced in the solid waste 
management with even larger success in implementation 
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and also some overall success in quality and efficiency. This 
way, the country rapidly reached the highest levels of qua-
lity when it comes to landfills and waste treatment; this 
is also the case for wastewater management, here with a 
lower success rates, but still with significant improvement.
3. Methodology and Data
We divided efficiency into financial and quality efficiency. 
The financial efficiency measures the financial perfor-
mance of each company. The quality efficiency addresses 
the quality and sustainability of the service provided to 
users by each company. These two scores were compu-
ted independently on a yearly basis, from 2007 to 2012, 
from the water sector regulator’s reports (ERSAR, 2008 
to 2013). Table 1 identifies the indicators used for each 
type of efficiency. Each indicator was measured in different 
units and scales, but then a ranking order with a score from 
1 to 5 (5 being the highest score) was used to harmonize 
and aggregate the information. The individual indicators 
were aggregated into a weighted average grade of 1 to 5 in 
terms of financial and quality efficiency grades, using the 
methodology used by Reis (2009) and Ribeiro (2015). 
Table 1 – Financial and quality indicators
Financial performance
Indicator Formula
Equity ratio Equity / Assets
Exploration margin Operational profit / Reve-
nues 
Permanent capital coverage Operational profit / Perma-
nent capital
Capitalization Equity / Share capital
ACP Average collection period
% Owned by AdP on the 
concession
Quality performance
Service availability
Occurence of failures on the network
Water safe for consumption
Coverage ratio
Unbilled water
Reabilitation of distribution networks
Suitability of human resources
Respect of legal parameters
Source: Ribeiro (2015)
In order to address how efficiency is determined by 
some variables, we used an OLS (Ordinary Least Squares), 
with the dependent variable being the global efficiency in 
the first test, the financial efficiency in the second test, and 
the quality efficiency in the third test. 
where:
• Yi is the explained performance variable and can 
be the financial efficiency grade (FinancialPerfi) 
or the quality efficiency grade (ServiceQuali) effi-
ciency grade. All 3 grades are defined in a range 
between 1 and 5. 
• concyear is the year that the concession was 
awarded.
• concper is the number of year of the concession.  
• contractchanges is the number of changes in the 
contract, in terms of contract extensions.
• public is a dummy variable capturing whether the 
project is managed by private companies or state 
owned entities. The dummy has the value of 1, 
if the company/services/concessionaire is held in 
majority by state owned companies or entities.
• land is defined as the area served by the company, 
measured in square kilometres. 
• houses is a variable that considers the number (in 
thousand) of homes in the area of the concession. 
That will allow us to consider the potential impact 
of population density.
• workers measures the number of workers in each 
company. This variable is a proxy for the size of 
the company.
• EPAL is a dummy variable referring to the 
upstream water supply company in Lisbon, na-
med EPAL. This entirely state-owned company 
has specificities, but serves a significant portion of 
the population of the country. We did not want 
to exclude this company from the sample, but we 
think that this special case deserves to be in a cate-
gory of itself.
4. Results
Results from this work are provided for the entire sample 
as for the upstream and downstream in Table 2. 
For the entire sample (tests 1 and 2), we found that 
earlier concessions are more efficient than those awarded 
later. This is due to the fact that the earlier concessions 
were the most consensual and needed, providing efficiency 
gains. It can also be the case of a certain degree of survival 
bias (the companies that are less efficient were terminated 
and re-concessioned). Indeed the political process was sor-
ted out easier in the more consensual cases, namely those 
cases requiring less investment were more likely to suc-
dossier
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ceed. On the other hand, it is also likely that the earlier 
concessions were also the ones that required less infrastruc-
ture investment and were less costly to do. 
We also found evidence that serving larger territories 
hurts efficiency, as the level of infrastructures required to 
cover wider surfaces is higher. Also, servicing more house-
holds tends to reduce quality efficiency. The economies of 
scale of servicing larger populations lead to higher levels of 
service, but not to financial efficiency.
These results also show that larger companies are more 
profitable than smaller companies. To our surprise this ef-
fect is not relevant in the quality of service. More workers 
do not imply any improvement in the service provided, 
which stresses that there is a reduced human intervention 
in the quality of the services rendered. 
The control dummy we introduced for the Lisbon wa-
ter supplier proves itself significant (5% for financial and 
quality performance, reinforced to 1% on overall perfor-
mance) on all regressions with the expected negative sign, 
confirming our hypothesis that the particularities of EPAL 
hurt its performance financially and in terms of quality of 
service.
The introduction of year dummies does not change 
the previous conclusions on the variables. Year effects do 
not affect performance in the financial grades, but they 
do have an impact on the quality performance. As the 
regulator attests, the quality of service has been improving 
throughout the recent years and that is noticeable by the 
positive significant coefficients on the year dummies.
For the upstream companies the results in tests 3 and 
4 generally confirm the results for the joint regressions, 
repeating most of the results, except that now EPAL only 
underperforms the upstream peers in quality of service, 
and no longer in financial terms. Another difference is 
that we lose the significance on the result of the private 
companies outperforming in quality the state owned ones. 
Probably the most surprising result in this subsample is 
the fact that the concession duration becomes significant 
and negatively affects the financial performance. This is 
somewhat of a surprise and contradicts our previous hy-
pothesis, as we expected the duration of the concessions to 
be longer in more consensual contracts. It seems however 
that in the case of the upstream companies an alternative 
explanation holds. Possibly the more troublesome conces-
sions are given more time to recover.
When it comes to the downstream companies (test 5 
to 6), apart from the significance on the age of the conces-
sions, again confirming that older contracts tend to be 
more efficient, everything else is not significant.
5. Conclusions 
Using the particular setting of the Portuguese water in-
dustry, we find evidence that hints at the fact that conces-
sions are a delicate political issue, and that the governmen-
tal entities are not always the best solution for providing a 
service of quality to the populations.
The rapid development of this industry in Portugal lead 
to an ever-improving service in a sector that is very criti-
cal for environmental policy and for the general wellbeing 
of the population. The evidence that these services can be 
provided by private entities in ways that actually increase 
their quality is certainly an interesting contribution that 
likely deserves further analysis in other settings and other 
countries. 
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Table 2 - Results
All Sample UpStream DownStream
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES FinancialPerf ServiceQual FinancialPerf ServiceQual FinancialPerf ServiceQual
Concyear -0.0378*** -0.04643*** -0.0358* -0.0602*** -0.0367*** -0.0389***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Concper -0.0065 0.00596 -0.0272*** 0.0188* 0.0169* -0.0078
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Contractchanges 0.0066 0.03335 0.1819 -0.1265 -0.1385 0.1502
(0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.1)
Public -0.0438 -0.22958** -0.1523 -0.1596 -0.1761 -0.25
(0.11) (0.11) (0.18) (0.19) (0.35) (0.36)
Land -0.0001*** -0.00003* -0.0001*** 0. -0.0001 0
(0) (0.00) (0) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Houses -0.00004 0.00065** 0.0002 0.001*** 0.0012 -0.0054
(0) (0.00) (0) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Workers 0.0022*** -0.00004 0.0014 -0.0011 0.002 0.0026
(0) (0.00) (0) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
EPAL -1.2011** -1.3928** -0.3876 -1.6577**
(0.55) (0.55) (0.79) (0.82)
2008.Year -0.0649 0.11269 -0.1113 0.1457 0.0269 0.0587
(0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.16) (0.19) (0.19)
2009.Year -0.0617 0.24024** -0.2295 0.3685** 0.1998 0.062
(0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.19)
2010.Year 0.009 0.27243** -0.2257 0.4353*** 0.3745 0.0407
(0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.19)
2011.Year 0.0463 0.44805*** -0.1056 0.5852*** 0.2679** 0.2546
(0.11) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.18)
Intercept 79.55*** 95.26*** 76.39** 122.34*** 76.43*** 80.69***
(22.08) (22.33) (36.46) (37.91) (27.88) (28.88)
Observations 280 280 158 158 122 122
R-squared 0.23 0.18 0.36 0.25 0.20 0.15
standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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1. Introduction
Electronic communications impact all of postal opera-
tors’ businesses. Traditional letter mail can be substituted 
by various electronic means, whereas quality parcels ser-
vices are of essence for online shops bypassing the tradi-
tional retail channels. There is a significant decrease in of 
letter mail volume. At the same time, most incumbent 
operators benefit from growing e-commerce and see their 
parcels volumes rising
These developments represent major challenges and op-
portunities for postal service providers. Incumbent postal 
operators (POs) have reacted and are reacting differently 
to those challenges. 
In their letter mail business, actions have included 
cutting costs, e.g. by reorganizing processes throughout 
the value chain, applying increased automation, outsour-
cing of carriers, reducing real wages, increasing prices 
above inflation in particular for single piece mail, redu-
cing service standards and/or universal service obligations 
(USO), improving services, for example intelligent mail 
or hybrid services, and leveraging the delivery network, 
for example by providing community and doorstep ser-
vices or cross-selling third-party products.
To participate in growing e-commerce markets, in-
cumbent POs have increasingly developed their parcels 
business. Amendments include improved end-to-end 
transit times, e.g. by better delivery times (Saturday deli-
very, Sunday delivery, evening delivery, selectable time 
slots) and faster delivery speed, and improved sender 
and recipient services (track & trace, collection at home, 
flexible delivery points, parcel lockers etc.). Many opera-
tors are also expanding toward logistics (all-in-one solu-
tions, warehousing, etc.).
Similarly, POs have developed their post office 
networks into different directions. Many have replaced 
their traditional post offices by agencies where basic postal 
services are provided in third-party retail outlets, e.g. gro-
cery stores. Other measures include outsourcing or fran-
chising of post offices to third parties, and leveraging post 
offices and infrastructure to enter new markets, e.g. finan-
cial services, insurance services, or high value retailing.
Incumbent POs have chosen different combinations of 
these measures. Consequently, they are developing into dif-
ferent directions. For example, Poste Italiane has become 
a much diversified group with postal services accounting 
for less than 15 per cent of revenues, whereas USPS is 
constrained by statute to focus on its traditional mail and 
parcels business. As a result, postal incumbents strongly 
differ in the composition of their revenue distributions.
2. Performance
Figure 1 illustrates weighted EBIT of selected incumbent 
operators and the change in total revenue from 2006 to 
2012 in a scatter plot. The size of the circles indicates 
absolute revenue, e.g. USPS and Deutsche Post achieve 
high revenues and therefore large circles. The colorization 
represents a classification based on the operators’ current 
revenue mix: Yellow for an important role of letter mail, 
orange for parcels, brown for logistics, red for an empha-
sis on retail services, blue for financial services, green for 
information services and black for telecommunications 
services. 
The figure is to be interpreted with caution, as there 
are many different factors influencing the apparent perfor-
mance of POs. For example the large revenue decline of 
Post NL was primarily caused by the divestment of TNT.
It may be concluded that the “blue” incumbent ope-
Regulation and postal strategies1
Christian Jaag*, Jose Parra Moyano*, Urs Trinkner*
1 This paper is a short version of Jaag et al. (2015).
* Swiss Economics
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major challenges and opportunities for postal service providers. Incumbent postal operators (POs) have reacted and are reacting differently to them. Our ana-
lysis links the specific regulatory context in which postal strategies are derived to the behavior and performance of incumbent operators. Finally, it compares 
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rators, i.e. the ones that put particular emphasis on finan-
cial services, perform particularly well in terms of EBIT 
and revenue development. It would be false, however, to 
conclude that all POs should diversify into financial ser-
vices and banking. Having already been active in financial 
transaction services in the past and disposing of the neces-
sary infrastructures seem to be important prerequisites for 
successful business development in this domain.
In the first quadrant with negative EBIT and revenue 
development, there are two operators (USPS and Correos), 
both relying strongly on letter mail. 
Generally, diversified postal incumbents appear to 
have developed better in relative terms. Examples of suc-
cessful diversification strategies are for example Australia 
Post with its community retail services provided in post 
offices, New Zealand Post and Swiss Post with their ban-
king services, and Poste Italiane with its success in selling 
life insurances. In these cases, diversification was based on 
leveraging existing infrastructure, competences and repu-
tation. Strategies that focus on a particular market, e.g. 
KEP markets or logistics, succeed in compensating losses 
in the letter market. Overall margins, however, appear to 
be more modest.
3. Generic strategies
Postal operators’ strategies are path-dependent and must 
comply with the country-specific regulatory framework. 
The strategies result in specific types of innovation and 
are reflected in business performance. Strategy, innova-
tion and performance in turn can influence regulation. 
Whereas regulation strategies aim at influencing regula-
tion directly, innovations may lead to changes of regula-
tions for example based on new possibilities to fulfill the 
USO. Performance on the other hand may limit or extend 
the scope of fundable USO. 
The dependency on the legal and regulatory environ-
ment of the successful strategies and the posts’ ability to 
adopt them results from a number of interaction channels: 
First, the state ownership and the associated principle of 
legality determines the legal boundaries of a PO’s scope 
of business. Second, the scope of the (past and current) 
USO determines the USP’s cost structure and its assets 
for new business development. Third, the status of market 
opening determines the degree of (potential) competition 
and the USP’s ability to finance its obligation with own 
funds (see for example Dietl et al., 2005). Fourth, the past 
definition of the USO and the performance of the USP 
determine its reputation and thereby its potential to leve-
rage it into new business fields where trust is key (see Dietl 
and Jaag, 2011). Fifth, the scope of the USO determines 
the viability of (the USP’s and its competitors’) postal and 
financial services due to the strategic deterrence effect (see 
Jaag, 2011). Sixth, the scope of the USO with associated 
mandatory services also determines whether new services 
must be economically viable on their own or whether they 
may benefit from induced cost savings of substituted tra-
ditional processes (e.g. physical delivery).
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Figure 1: Performance of selected incumbent operators
Source: Swiss Economics
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Table 1 illustrates the interdependencies based on 
a selection of case studies with emphasis on regulations 
concerning the post office network. The figure reveals subs-
tantial differences in the evolution of post office networks 
that can be explained by different initial regulations. 
The interdependencies also determine the optimal type 
of innovation: the more flexible a post is in terms of its 
infrastructures, the more attractive investment in pro-
cess innovation is. Conversely, e.g. if the USO is strongly 
input-oriented, product innovation aiming to utilize these 
assets is more attractive. 
One size of a corporate strategy does not fit all. This 
also implies that there are things which POs can learn 
from each other in terms of new business development, 
but only to the extent that their regulatory frameworks 
support similar strategic choices. 
4. Conclusion
Many POs have significantly and successfully moved away 
from their traditional core businesses. In particular, opera-
tors with banking services have been able to achieve growth 
and above average margins. However, the optimal business 
strategies are not the same for all POs since they are often 
only second best, given the specific regulatory framework. 
Hence, regulation is relevant for understanding business 
strategies and the great policy challenge consists in accom-
plishing the optimal co-evolution of regulation and its ins-
titutions with market developments.
With binding regulations in place (e.g. USO prescri-
bing infrastructures or processes), these regulations should 
be complemented with legal and regulatory support the 
following dimensions: First, there needs to be a legal 
foundation for diversification into new business to better 
utilize the necessary infrastructures or processes. Second, 
regulated services must be able to be substituted over time 
(i.e. discontinued) if there is an innovative alternative in 
place. Third, any cross-subsidization of existing or new 
services should be limited in order to allow new services to 
compete on a level playing field. 
As an example, regulations that prescribe a minimum 
number of Post offices need to go along with a correspon-
ding legality and ability to diversify to bring value into the 
existing post office network.
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Table 1: Post office network regulations and development
Regulation Strategy Innovation Performance
AU Maintain 4000 retail 
outlets, including 2500 
in rural/remote areas
Bring value to post 
office network by provi-
ding 3rd party services, 
e.g. banks
IT platform facilitating 
high value retailing with 
3rd parties
Strong growth and 
profitable post office 
network
NZ Provide 880 retail 
outlets, thereof 240 post 
offices
Bring value to remai-
ning post offices
Launch of KiwiBank Strong growth and 
profitability of bank
UK Full market opening, 
structural separation of 
post office network
Compete for letters and 
parcels
Process innovations Limited growth and 
EBIT margin
CH Minimum accessibility, 
financial transactions 
in USO
Develop all business 
divisions and in parti-
cular PostFinance
Process and product 
innovations 
Solid growth, strong 
development of PostFi-
nance
US Post office require-
ments, no diversifica-
tion allowed
Develop mail and par-
cels business
Process innovations Substantially negative 
margins
IT Full market opening, 
post offices for 96% of 
municipalities+
Diversify Launch of BancoPosta, 
PosteAssicure, Poste-
Vita, and more
Strong growth of new 
services
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1. Introduction
The Brazilian economy is greatly dependent on primary 
commodities, mainly mineral and agricultural. These 
goods are also prevalent in terms of international trade for 
the country (Sampaio & Daychoum, 2015). Most of these 
commodities are produced in the rural side of the country. 
Hence, the need to transport it for long distances to ports 
located on the Atlantic coast renders freight a key cost 
component in the country’s competitiveness.
However, the Brazilian railroad system is still in its 
infancy in terms of the extension of the network and 
transportation capacity. This configuration is partially the 
result of public policies adopted in the second half of the 
last century that favored road transportation. Considering 
that several findings in the economic literature point to 
efficiency gains of rails, Brazil nowadays faces a major chal-
lenge due to its unbalanced transportation infrastructure 
matrix. 
At first, the Brazilian government attempted to tackle 
this problem through a state-investor model launched 
in the 1980s (World Bank, 2007). Then, a privatization 
program followed in the 1990s. The relatively poor per-
formance of such reforms motivated the government to 
reform the regulatory framework from a vertically integra-
ted framework to a totally unbundled system. 
In 2012 the federal government launched the National 
Integration Logistics Program (PIL). Among other goals, 
the Program aimed to foster investments in the railway sys-
tem. The basic changes consist of unbundling infrastruc-
ture and service provision, introducing an Independent 
Railway Operators and a new role for a state-owned com-
pany, VALEC. According to the proposal the company 
would be required to purchase upfront all transportation 
capacity from infrastructure concessionaires, reselling it it 
in the market through public auctions (Pinheiro, 2014). 
Several discussions and criticisms followed the propo-
sal, leading to a temporary hault. Additonally, severe fiscal 
constraints contributed to postpone the implementation 
of the 2012 proposal. However, since not even a single 
new railway was auctioned between 2012 and 2015, the 
discussions and challenges still remain; that is, what is the 
proper model for Brazil to induce investments and impro-
ved performance in the country´s railway system? This dis-
cussion is timely since in 2015 the Brazilian government 
launched the second stage of its logistics program – PIL 2.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the potential im-
plications of the proposed regulatory changes assessing its 
effects on a firm holding a concession. In order to achieve 
the stated goals, the article is structured as follows. First, 
we present the basic economic principles regarding regu-
lation of railways. Then we discuss the current Brazilian 
regulatory framework and the changes proposed in 2012, 
which have not been implemented so far.  Next, we pre-
sent our case study that we based on different regulatory 
scenarios and their possible impacts on a concessionaire. 
Finally, we comment some initial findings and ideas for 
further research. 
2. Regulatory Framework
2.1 Regulation of rail system - the basics
The rail system is a natural monopoly organized in a mate-
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preliminary assesment
Patrícia Sampaioa, Joisa Dutrab, Edson Gonçalvesc, Mariam Daychoumd, Bruno Palermoe
a Professor, FGV Law School, Rio de Janeiro. Researcher at the Research Center on Law and Economics/FGV Law School. Praia de Botafogo 190, 13th floor, 
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil,. patricia.pinheiro@fgv.br
b Professor, FGV School of Economics, Rio de Janeiro. Head of the Research Center on Regulation and Infrastructure (CERI/FGV). Rio de Janeiro. Praia de Botafogo 
190, 11th floor, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil. joisa.dutra@fgv.br
c Professor, FGV School of Economics, Rio de Janeiro. Researcher at the Research Center on Regulation and Infrastructure (CERI/FGV). Rio de Janeiro. Praia de 
Botafogo 190, 11th floor, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil. edson.goncalves@fgv.br
d Lawyer and master degree candidate, School of Economics, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. Researcher at the Research Center on Law and Economics/FGV Law 
School. Praia de Botafogo 190, 13th floor, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil, mariam.daychoum@fgv.br
e MA in Business Economics – EPGE/FGV, Rio de Janeiro. Praia de Botafogo 190, 11th floor, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil, brunobpalermo@gmail.com
dossier
e r  tries Quar erly | vol. 17 | o 3 | 2015
Abstract - In this paper we analyze the impact of a reform in Brazilian railway regulatory framework proposed in 2012. According to our results 
incumbent firms may lose value and the state may experience increasing fiscal costs.
14
Network Industries newsletter  | vol. 13 | n°3 | 2014        19 
dossier
Net In  Quarterly | l. 7 o   | 2 15
rial and continual network. Sectors with this structure are 
characterized by high fixed and sunk costs, with a tech-
nology exhibiting large economies of scale and scope, as 
well as network externalities. Such circumstances would, 
in principle, undermine competition. Hence, rail trans-
portation would be a vertically-integrated market. 
To overcome such issues, sector regulation may pro-
mote competition through unbundling schemes, which 
can be implemented by three alternative arrangements: 
(i) accounting separation, adopting different accounts to 
different activities within the same company in order to 
secure transparency and especially aiming at preventing 
cross-subsidies; (ii) legal unbundling, which forbids the 
same legal entity to be in charge of different segments of 
the value chain; and (iii) corporate structural unbundling, 
which prohibits an economic group (either through one or 
different companies) to perform different economic activi-
ties in the same sector. 
A decision towards unbundling must consider a num-
ber of variables, which may also differ among distinct 
utilities. Shall the owner of the cargo be allowed to hold 
stakes in an infrastructure concessionaire? Shall the owner 
of the cargo be entitled to become service freight operator? 
Shall the infrastructure concessionaire be allowed to ren-
der services as a freight operator? Will the intended bene-
fits of unbundling and competition in the railway sector 
overcome the economies of scale of a vertically-integra-
ted structure and the transaction costs that are typical of 
unbundled public utility industries? 
Most of the answers to these questions depend signifi-
cantly on variables such as the size of the market, the range 
of products being transported, risks allocation, safety of 
operations. Additionally, Laperouza & Finger (2009) 
stress the need to balance short-term and long-term policy 
goals, such as developing the network and charging tariffs 
that would grant a proper return to investments.
2.2 The 1990 model
In the ‘90s Brazil decided to grant concession in the alrea-
dy-existing railways and transportation services to pri-
vates through public procurement processes. The awarded 
concessions are vertically-integrated, including both 
infrasctructure and services. According to Venckovsky 
(2005), all the consortiums entitled to such concessions 
comprise a commodity producer. Regulation was ini-
tially established by a Presidential Decree and acts from 
the Ministry of Transportation. Only in 2001, after the 
privatization process took place, the National Terrestrial 
Transportation Agency (ANTT) was created as an inde-
pendent administrative body within the federal Public 
Administration.
2.3 The “new” model
The Brazilian railway system is going through a period of 
change regarding its institutional design. The resumption 
of the debate regarding Brazilian railroads was driven by 
the national Logistics Investment Plan (PIL), which aims 
to reinforce the role of this modal as a relevant logistics so-
lution. This would be achieved by expanding the network 
and lowering tariffs.
Three institutional players are in charge of the gover-
nance of the sector: the indepent regulatory body, ANTT; 
the Planning and Logistics Company (EPL), which pro-
vides services regarding to projects, studies and research 
to support the planning of logistics and transportation in 
the country; and VALEC - Engineering, Construction and 
Logistics S.A.. This last company was restructured several 
times in its history. Nowadays VALEC provides various 
types of services in the railway sector, such as managing 
railway infrastructure, operations’ programming, indus-
trial efforts’ coordination, development of sectorial studies 
and of transportation systems.
The structural reform underlying the proposal of the 
2012 PIL aimed at increasing investments in the railway 
infrastructure by means of competition. The program es-
tablished a new concession model, requiring segregation 
of the sectoral activities; that is, separating infrastructure 
construction and maintenance from the activity of capa-
city management and from transportation service provi-
sion. It can be argued that this goal departs from the 1990 
reform that resorted to privatization to modernize the 
already-existing railways.
The initial setting of the proposed model requires 
VALEC to anually purchase all the operational capacity 
of the railway infrastructure concessionaire reselling it 
through competitive bidding procedures to companies 
willing to provide freight services. The auctions would 
grant access to the infrastructure along the whole railway 
system. According to ANTT, the object of the new conces-
sion agreements would comprise construction, operation, 
maintenance, monitoring and management of infrastruc-
ture. However services’ activities and trains maintenance 
would be performed by the Independent Rail Operators 
(OFIs). OFIs are legal entities authorized by ANTT to 
provide rail transportation services. Hence under the pro-
posed framework open access would be granted to the rail 
network.
According to the proposal, VALEC would manage the 
grid capacity, purchasing it upfront from infrastructure 
concessionaires. The subsequent allocation of this capacity 
is to be held through auctions to: (i) users willing to carry 
their own cargo; (ii) independent rail operators (OFI); and 
(iii) vertically-integrated railway concessionaires - the same 
ones privatized in the 1990s. Therefore, VALEC would be 
in charge of an organized market to match providers of 
15
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rail infrastructure and those in need of transport services. 
Instead of interacting directly, transactions among these 
counterparts would be mediated by VALEC – the vendors 
selling their full capacity and the users purchasing capacity 
from Valec. 
Since the beginning of 2015, however, this new fra-
mework has been loosing support even at the government 
level. Severe fiscal constraints currently faced by Brazil 
coupled with preliminary analysis and investigations held 
by the Federal Audit Court (TCU) and the Ministery 
of Finance point to a potential government failure that 
may result from the new role to be assumed by VALEC. 
Additionally, it seems that such new unique regulatory 
model may be plagued by technical flaws. It has been also 
undermined by the lack of public scrutinity and regulatory 
oversight. 
In this context, the following section presents a case 
study assessing the impact of the proposed reform in an 
incumbent firm operating in the railway sector in Brazil. 
3. The ALL Case Study
In order to assess the potential impact of the proposed 
reform in an incumbent firm, we present the results of 
an exercise that calculates the present value (PV) of (i) a 
railway facility belonging to a real concessionaire today 
(Scenario 1); (ii) the effect of turning this firm into an in-
frastructure provider for VALEC while remaining an ope-
rator through the same economic group, (Scenario 2); or 
(iii) in case the regulatory framework mandates full open 
access without the intermediation of VALEC to induce 
competition in the railway (Scenario 3). 
The selected company for the analysis is América Latina 
Logística (ALL), the largest company in the Brazilian rai-
lway sector that is publicly traded. The model considers 
the method of discounted cash flow. Also the assessment 
is restricted to railway networks directly operated by ALL. 
3.1 Main results
Considering the role of VALEC as the sole capacity buyer, 
the value estimated for the concession is 42% smaller 
than the scenario where the firm continues to operate 
vertically integrated. Hence if regulation changes towards 
unbundling and with VALEC operating as an intermedia-
ry, the incumbent firm would be seriously impaired. 
The entry of a new competitor would have a higher 
impact on the concession’s PV when compared to scenario 
2 (VALEC). For some scenarios, the best decision for the 
firm is to abandon the concession. This is the case whe-
never a very large competitor enters the market reaching 
a share at least as high as 50%. The resulting price war 
leads to a price drop of 35%. Also, in the event of growth 
lower than expected, a 40% fall in price would render the 
concession economically inviable. It is worth noting that 
this is a very likely scenario. 
4. Concluding Remarks and Further Research
We conclude that the reform in the Brazilian Railway re-
gulation proposed in 2012 may lead to a decrease in an 
incumbent firm`s value. It may also disincentivize esta-
blished entrepreneurs and/or newcomers when compared 
to vertically-integrated schemes. For some specific scena-
rios, the change may be beneficial to the firm. However, 
such scenarios are potentially associated to higher costs to 
VALEC and, hence, to the Brazilian government. 
Even though the model launched in 2012 is currently 
loosing support, the main questions underlying its initial 
conception remain: is the proposed unbundling scheme 
likely to foster investments in the railway system leading to 
lower logistics costs? Would the current vertically-integra-
ted model coupled with open access rules lead to improved 
performance in the sector? Can a scheme under which the 
government, through a State-owned company, acts as an 
intermediary between capacity owners and transportation 
service companies be successful in mitigating investors’ 
risks and improving the use of railways as a means to cargo 
transportation? These are the questions we are willing to 
answer with a broader research agenda regarding Brazilian 
railway regulation, including some extensions in the finan-
cial model to better introduce risk-sharing mechanisms. 
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Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries face the 
medium term challenges of creating employment oppor-
tunities for a rapidly growing young population, serving 
local markets and exports needs. The liberalization of the 
telecom sector contributes largely to the economic growth 
through the Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) development and diffusion in the economy. With 
increased mobile competition in MENA, mobile reve-
nues have contributed to economic growth, job creation, 
greater investment and integration in the global economy 
(Hakim and Neaime, 2014)1. In practice, telecom reforms 
consist of three main features: the introduction of com-
petition where possible, the privatization of State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) and finally the creation of new regula-
tory mechanisms and institutions notably an Independent 
Regulatory Agency (IRA). 
A crucial question for policy makers is what should 
be the optimal sequence of the reforms considering that 
privatization, liberalization and the creation of an IRA 
might occur simultaneously or sequentially. This paper 
deals more precisely with the following question: should 
a country create an IRA before the privatization of the 
incumbent operator and/ or the introduction of market 
competition, or is it better to liberalize and privatize be-
fore creating an IRA, as it has been done typically in some 
EU countries, like Germany (Glachant et al., 2008)2. Up 
to now, no single way to proceed has emerged; countries 
have followed quite heterogeneous and changing policies 
regarding the sequence. Still, for most MENA countries as 
for the other countries, liberalization is typically done in 
two steps. First step consists of the enactment of a telecom 
law and the establishment of an independent regulatory 
authority. In the second step, dependent on the success of 
the first one, the telecom authority starts to liberalize the 
telecom market through restructuring of the incumbent 
operator and the promotion of entry of new investors. But 
as we will see, that is not always the case; specifically, in the 
case of MENA countries, while the law reforming the tele-
com sector has been adopted by, in practice, the powers 
delegated to the IRA, and the number of new entrants 
does not fit with the standard approach adopted in EU.
Intuitively, the reforms’ sequences should have an im-
pact on the behaviors of both public and private actors 
and consequently affect the performance of the industry. 
Typically, an IRA is supposed to create the conditions for 
new entrants to have a reasonable expectation of obtai-
ning a return for their investments and the insurance not 
to be expropriated. As argued by Elena et al. (2013)3, 
however, after MENA political transitions following the 
Arab Spring of 2011, “the absence of significant economic 
reforms, combined with persistent political and macroeco-
nomic instability, is likely to keep investment and growth 
below potential in developing MENA, not only in the 
short run but in coming years, unless there is a break with 
past practices.”
1. Overview of MENA telecom sector
The reforms process in MENA countries remains far from 
complete in spite of international pressures from the IMF, 
WTO or the WB to implement these reforms. Market 
liberalization in telecom sector has been slower in MENA 
countries than elsewhere in the developing world. In 
terms of entry of new operators, as of 2010, every MENA 
country has at least two mobile operators; however, this is 
not the case in the fixed-line market which is however a 
key aspect for the liberalization. Although fixed-line mar-
kets are competitive in Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, 
Saudi Arabia, Sudan and United Arab Emirates, some 
countries still have a monopolist in their fixed-line ser-
vices as Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Qatar, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. Moreover, the monopo-
list incumbent operator remains a state-owned operator 
in Algeria, Djibouti, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Syria and 
Yemen which reinforces inertia and rigidity.
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However, liberalization and privatization in MENA 
region should not be taken for granted. For ins-
tance, Algeria has repeatedly postponed the privatiza-
tion of the incumbent operator it committed to in the 
Telecommunications Sector Policy Statement in 20001. 
Many countries like Lebanon still have a monopolist state-
owned incumbent operator. Although the restructuring 
and privatization of Liban Telecom was adopted in the 
Telecommunications Law 2002, it still didn’t take place 
up to now mostly due to political conflicts. Indeed, the 
telecommunications markets in MENA region remain 
less open to competition than elsewhere in the developing 
world. Up to 2010, in addition to Algeria and Lebanon, 
many MENA countries still have a monopolist incumbent 
operator as Djibouti, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Syria, 
Tunisia and Yemen. However, some countries succeeded 
to have two or more fixed operators as Bahrain, Jordan, 
Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Sudan. 
As a result, the range of competition varies across 
MENA region. The first group is composed of most Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Although not all 
GCC countries are opened for competition and for foreign 
investments, they still have the financial resources to invest 
domestically in the telecom sector. However, the perfor-
mances in these countries are very different. For example, 
Kuwait and Yemen have implemented relatively similar 
reforms, but the levels of performance in both countries 
are far from comparable in terms of telecom performance: 
for example, the level of fixed penetration is 20.7 % in 
Kuwait compared to 4.35% in Yemen in 2010. Moreover, 
the mobile penetration is 160.8% in Kuwait in 2010 com-
pared to 46.1% in Yemen. The other exception among 
GCC countries is Oman in the sense that, even if it is a 
completely closed country to foreign equity share, it has a 
competitive fixed and mobile market, as well as a partially 
private incumbent operator. The other group of countries 
– mostly oil importing countries which contrary to GCC 
don’t have enough domestic capital – is facing external 
financing constraints and fiscal pressures. North-African 
countries know moderate level of competition compa-
red to GCC countries, with the exception of Morocco. 
Lebanon and Libya are crippled with high service tariffs 
or entry barriers with a state-owned monopoly in the fixed 
sector and a government owned-duopoly in the mobile 
sector. However, there are countries in the region that are 
quite advanced and have ICT levels quite comparable with 
developed countries, as UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar. 
All these countries are oil producers and are small compa-
red to North African countries as to Egypt.
In this paper, we assess the efficiency conditions for 
regulatory reforms focusing on the telecom reforms 
sequence which has been a neglected issue in MENA 
agenda until now while other countries experiences sug-
gest that it is a crucial issue. We aim to characterize the 
impact of the reforms sequence on the efficiency of the 
telecommunication reform specifically structural features 
that have long-term effects on the provision of backbone 
infrastructure services as the telecommunications sector. 
Reaching a consensus on economic reforms for MENA 
region becomes a pre-requisite for high economic growth 
in developing MENA countries.
2. The testable propositions
Very few papers (to our knowledge only the studies by 
Wallsten, 2003 and Fink et al, 2003)   explore the impact 
of reforms sequences in telecom sector, but none of them 
focuses on MENA countries which might be due to the 
lack of liable data and time series to implement an ade-
quate empirical analysis. The aim of our analysis  is exactly 
to start filling this gap. Before showing our main results, 
we now provide a brief sum up of the different hypotheses 
we investigate in terms of the impact of reforms sequence.
2.1. Regulation-Privatization Sequence 
A separate (independent) regulator appears as a way to 
eliminate inefficiencies occurring in the public operator 
functioning and regulation through incentive regulation 
notably. Therefore, it is recommended to have a new regu-
latory framework prior to privatization, i.e. a reregulation 
(Guertman, Ménard 2009) . Spiller (1993)  confirmed 
that the prior or simultaneous development of the requi-
red institutions is crucial when the incumbent operator is 
privatized. This would serve to avoid opportunistic beha-
vior and give a guarantee for investors against the risk of 
expropriation.
Wallsten (2003) tests the effect of the sequence of 
introducing different reforms; he finds that establishing 
a regulator prior to the privatization process is correlated 
with improvements in mobile and fixed-line telephony 
penetration and incumbent’s investments. Consequently, 
investors pay more for telecom firms in countries that esta-
blished a regulator prior to the privatization process.
From the above analysis, we derive the following 
proposition:
Proposition 1.  The establishment of a separate regula-
tory authority prior to the privatization of the incumbent 
operator helps improving the telecom sector performance 
(in terms of increasing service penetration, productivity 
dossier
r  I tries Quar erly | vol. 17 | o 3 | 2015
1  This policy Statement called for the gradual liberalization of the sector including the privatization of the public operator. 
18
Network Industries newsletter  | vol. 13 | n°3 | 2014        23 
and reduction of retail prices which are our three perfor-
mance indicators).
2.2. Regulation-Competition Sequence 
The presence of a separate regulatory authority prior to 
the introduction of market competition is crucial.  An 
IRA should put in place the rules required to introduce 
market competition and to efficiently regulate the residual 
monopoly elements in the sector (Estache et al., 2006) . 
Such rules concern: licensing conditions, interconnection 
agreements, technical standards and management of scarce 
resources in non-discriminatory way. Pro-competitive 
measures taken in this phase should result largely in higher 
penetration and lower prices. Consequently, the establish-
ment of a regulatory authority before the entry of new 
competitors is a priority, in order to oversee the incumbent 
behavior and to serve as a guarantee and credible commit-
ment for potential new entrants. We thus have the fol-
lowing proposition:
Proposition 2. The establishment of a separate regula-
tory authority, before the introduction of competition in 
the market, helps increasing the telecom penetration and 
helps decreasing prices.
 3. The Empirical analysis
We develop an empirical analysis on 17 MENA countries 
from 1995-2010 to explore the impact of the sequences 
of different reforms – namely the Regulation-Privatization 
sequence and the Regulation-Competition sequence – on 
the telecom sector performance in the voice market for 
fixed and mobile segments. 
3.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 below provides basic analysis of the data, allowing 
for a number of observations. To assess sector perfor-
mance, we use three dimensions: access rates, productivity 
and prices. The higher the access rates and the produc-
tivity the better the performances. On the contrary, the 
lower the prices, the higher the performances because it 
means the higher the competition.  The access rate variable 
is measured by the fixed-line and mobile penetration (the 
number of fixed and mobile telephone lines in a country 
per 100 inhabitants, in natural log). The productivity is 
measured by the number of telephone subscribers in fixed 
and mobile telephone per employee. To measure the price 
levels, we use different prices corresponding to different 
telephone services: first, the monthly subscription for resi-
dential telephone service in US$ and second the price of a 
dossier
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Table 1. Summary statistics
Mean                                                                                      
(Standard Deviation, Number of observations)
Variable IRA before Priva-
tization =0
IRA before Pri-
vatization =1
IRA before 
Competition =0
IRA before 
Competition =1
Access indicators
Fixed per 100 inhabitants 13.14
(9.35, 227)
11.33
(3.59, 45)
13.1
(9.2, 200)
12.13
(7.06, 72)
Mobile per 100 inhabitants 30.12
(42.14, 227)
73.6
(43.27, 45)
22.97
(34.79, 200)
77.15
(47.24, 72)
Productivity indicator
Total Lines (Fixed and Mobile) per Employee 246.82
(296.61, 179)
935.8
(501.06, 38)
207.61
(229.3, 162)
838.36
(527.5, 55)
Affordability indicators
Monthly subscription for residential telephone 
service
5.54
(4.42, 196)
8.11
(3.71, 39)
5.96
(4.64, 166)
5.98
(3.83, 69)
Price of a 3-minute fixed telephone local call (off-
peak rate) in US $
0.05
(0.06, 199)
0.12
(0.16, 44)
0.48
(0.05, 174)
0.11
(0.14, 69)
Fixed Basket 7.04
(5.63, 174)
12.02
(7.51, 38)
7.43
(5.95, 144)
9.02
(6.88, 68)
Mobile cellular prepaid- price of 3-minute local call 
(peak) in US $
0.48
(0.46, 189)
0.52
(0.39, 37)
0.5
(0.49, 170)
0.46
(0.33, 56)
Mobile cellular prepaid- price of 3-minute local call 
(off-peak) in US $
0.38
(0.43, 176)
0.44
(0.37, 37)
0.39
(0.46, 157)
0.398
(0.31, 56)
Mobile Basket 8.48
(8.88, 174)
9.66
(7.47, 37)
8.7
(9.33, 156)
8.65
(6.37, 55)
Source: Own calculations from ITU database and collected data.
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3-minute fixed telephone local call (at peak and off-peak 
rates) in US$. We also use mobile price of 3-minute local 
call (at peak and at off-peak rates) in US$. As suggested by 
the ITU (2012), we construct fixed and mobile price bas-
kets for mobile and fixed-lines2 using the ITU database.
Looking at the average values of our performances 
variables shows that an independent regulator prior to 
the privatization of the incumbent seems to lead to lower 
fixed access (11,33 fixed lined per 100 inhabitant when 
there is an IRA prior to the privatization instead of 13,14 
when there is no creation of IRA before privatization, i.e.. 
a decrease of 14%) and higher prices (12,02US$ for the 
fixed basket when there is an IRA prior to the privatiza-
tion instead of 7,04US$ when there is no creation of IRA 
before privatization, i.e. an increase of 70%). However, the 
creation of an IRA prior to the privatization process leads 
to higher productivity (935,8 total lines per employees 
instead of 246,82). Concerning the establishment of an 
IRA prior to the introduction of competition in the mar-
ket, it leads also to lower fixed access (13,1 fixed lined per 
100 inhabitants when there is an IRA prior to the compe-
tition instead of 12,13 when there is no creation of IRA 
before competition), but to higher mobile access (77,15 
instead of 22,15) and higher productivity per Employee 
(838,36 Total Lines - Fixed and Mobile) when there is 
an IRA prior to the competition instead of 207,61 Total 
Lines (Fixed and Mobile) per Employee when there is no 
IRA prior to the competition. However, the effect of this 
sequence on prices is not clear-cut. Definitely, descriptive 
statistics do not necessarily hold for the econometric spe-
cification. We therefore conduct an econometric analysis 
using Instrumental Variable-Two Stages Least Squares (IV-
2SLS) estimation while accounting for the endogeneity of 
reforms and including year dummies.to validate or nuance 
these previous conclusions.  
4. Discussions of the main results
Focusing on the sequence between Regulation and 
Privatization, we find that this sequence helps improving 
fixed access since this provides investors with credibility 
and confidence before entering the market and new inves-
tors would ensure they will not be abused by the presence 
of the State as main shareholder. Thus, the prior establish-
ment of a regulator helps eliminating the negative effect of 
privatization on the fixed access. This result is important 
since a regulator serves as a guarantee that the privatized 
incumbent would not restrict output and reduces the fixed 
access; a privatized firm has no incentives to offer services 
if this would not be profitable for it. However, the prior 
establishment of a regulator leads to an increase in fixed 
prices, which implies that they would remain high due to 
privatizing the incumbent operator. This effect has a nega-
tive impact on consumers; however it would give incen-
tives for investors to enter the market. 
The sequence between Regulation and Competition has 
a negative significant effect on the fixed access. Therefore, 
the regulator – assuming that it introduces the rules that 
would facilitate the operation of new competitors in the 
market in terms of interconnection agreements and licen-
sing conditions – hinders competition in the market. 
Moreover, the prior establishment of a regulator reduces 
telecom productivity. These negative effects could only 
be explained by the regulatory capture by the incumbent 
operator. In other words, result seems to suggest that a de 
jure independent regulator do not necessarily imply that 
the regulator is also de facto independent. The Appendix 
below shows that even after IRA establishment since 1995 
in different MENA countries, not all of them become bet-
ter off; only the countries above the line in the access and 
productivity graphs in figures 1, 2 and 3 (and below the 
line in the prices graphs in figures 4, 5 and 6) have better 
performance indicators after IRA establishment. So, the 
establishment of an independent regulator is not a suffi-
cient condition to reach a better telecom performance. 
Constraints to the regulator’s action limit its independence 
by increasing the risk of capture, thus exposing its action 
to external interests. For example, in the absence of suffi-
cient resources (such as budget, jurisdiction or technical 
expertise), the regulator may depend on the information 
provided by market operators, that often are state-owned 
companies whose leaders are appointed by political autho-
rities. A form of political capture may especially emerge 
when the issues at stake are related to tariffs. In this situa-
tion, consumers’ opinion deeply affects incumbents, whose 
main interest is not to lose voters’ support and maintain 
a sort of social order and stability. Thus, this reflects the 
importance of institutions to set the market rules since the 
incumbent can represent a high barrier for new entrants 
by preventing interconnection, even by adopting vertical 
price squeezing or by capturing the regulator in place. It 
is obvious that without an IRA, no incumbent operator 
would allow competition, since it would not be profitable 
for it; however, its role needs to be more efficient. All in 
all, the presence of IRA apparently represents a necessary 
condition for the creation of a favourable regulatory fra-
mework, but it is not, in itself, sufficient to actually achieve 
first best outcomes. The reason lies in that the effectiveness 
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peak rate and 15 at off-peak rate). As in ITU (2012), the mobile basket is equivalent to 50.87 minutes, we calculate it as 10* (mobile price of 3-minute 
local call (at peak) + mobile price of 3-minute local call (at off-peak)) due to the lack of some prices indicators. The monthly mobile price basket 
includes the price of 30 outgoing calls (on-net, off-net and to a fixed line, for peak, off-peak and weekend periods), plus 100 SMS messages (50 on-net 
and 50 off-net).
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of regulation depends also on the characteristics of the 
environment in which IRAs operate, notably on the set 
of political and social institutions of the country. Indeed, 
factors such as the executive-legislative-judiciary relations, 
the bureaucratic system, the level of political stability, the 
degree of conflict among stakeholders, the arbitrariness or 
the scale of corruption have a significant influence on the 
regulatory performance by determining the receptivity of 
the environment to regulation activities. In turn, this has 
predictably a strong impact on private investments. To 
avoid mistakes in our estimations, we do consider such po-
litical and institutional differences across MENA countries 
in our empirical investigation.
Finally we notice that this sequence increases the fixed 
prices, due to tariff rebalancing system. This might be a 
way to attract investors since this would be profitable for 
them to have higher prices and to avoid any uncompeti-
tive behavior by excessively reducing fixed prices by the 
incumbent operator – as a way to deter entry in the fixed 
market. 
5. Conclusion
This paper is a first attempt to empirically test the effect 
of sequences in telecom reform on sector performances in 
MENA countries, as a group of developing countries that 
can be compared with each other because of the existing 
political, geographical and historical similarities.
It is noteworthy that the establishment of IRA appears 
more valuable when we test for its sequence; the prior pres-
ence of IRA before other reforms, such as privatization and 
competition, matters.  Such results are of great importance 
for policy makers in MENA countries, since it implies that 
setting rules for the regulatory framework is a priority; and 
the main concern for policy makers should be the gua-
rantee of its credibility and effectiveness. New rules and 
stronger institutions are needed to ensure effective telecom 
market, effective competition in fixed segments and better 
monitoring for newly privatized incumbents. 
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Appendix. The effect of IRA establishment on telecom 
performance
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Figure 1. The effect of an independent regulator on the fixed 
penetration three years before its establishment compared to 
three years after its establishment.
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Figure 2. The effect of an independent regulator on the mobile 
penetration.
Figure 3. The effect of an independent regulator on the 
productivity measure.
Figure 4. The effect of an independent regulator on the fixed 
monthly subscription.
Figure 5. The effect of an independent regulator on the price of 3 
minute fixed call three years.
Figure 6. The effect of an independent regulator on the price of 3 
minute mobile call.
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Network Industries Quarterly, Vol. 17, issue 4, 2015 (December) “Local utilities and public services in 
Europe: challenges and opportunities” 
Starting from the ’90s, public utilities have experienced radical changes in all European countries. 
Corporatisation and privatisation reshaped relationships in corporate governance, while the libera-
lisation of the energy sector and of network industries in general radically changed the rules of the 
game for both economic and political actors at different levels. These transformations impinged on 
multiple territorial levels. Namely, the EU is interested in increasing the level of competitiveness in 
public service production and provision, while national governments underwent major transforma-
tions towards both a regulatory type of State and multi-level governance. In this context, regional 
and local governments get more and more involved in policy implementation and management of 
contracts in services such as water, waste, transport, electricity and gas distribution. As a result, the 
scenario for local public services is multifaceted, depending on the country and the sector, leaving 
many open questions for firms, regulators and local contractors. Despite the relevance of the local 
facet of these transformations, the local governance of these services has not yet been studied in 
a comparative way and with the goal of distinguishing similarities and differences across countries 
and sectors. This call for papers aims at filling this gap, searching for academic contributions able to 
explore the main challenges and opportunities for present local utilities and particularly linked to:
• The prevalent management option in use in the service (direct management, affirmage, service 
contracts);
• The definition of the territorial scale for the provision of services at the local level;
• The challenges of local authorities and the relationship with national regulatory agencies in the 
different sectors;
• The different strategies of M&A and internationalisation of local utilities for market restructuring 
and the relation with national champions;
• The challenges related to technology and infrastructures in the different sectors;
• The new relationship with local governments, considering both the management of contracts and 
the corporate governance of mixed-owned firms;
• The accountability issues in local public service management.
We welcome proposals in the form of a short abstract of max 200 words that touch these and 
other issues related to local public utilities, either with a case study or a comparative approach and 
grounded on empirical research. The deadline for abstracts is September 30th, 2015. The final paper 
should not exceed 1.700 words length (all included). A preliminary draft is expected by November 
26th, 2015. If you are interested to contribute, please send an email to the editors of this special 
issue on “Local utilities and public services in Europe: challenges and opportunities”, Ms Maria Tullia 
Galanti (maria.galanti@unimi.it) and Mr Marco Di Giulio (marco.digiulio3@unibo.it), with a cc to 
Prof. Matthias Finger (FSR.Transport@eui.eu). 
The Network Industries Quarterly carries an ISBN number and is published by Ecole Polytechnique 
Fédérale Lausanne (EPFL) and the Florence School of Regulation (European University Institute). Pu-
blished four times a year and distributes to approx. 6000 interested subscribers worldwide, the NIQ 
is included in Cadmus, the EUI’s Research Repository. You can find the latest issues of the NIQ here:
- Vol 17 - no 2 - 2015 – Urban Energy Transition 
- Vol 17 - no 1 - 2015 – Network Industries in Eurasia  
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UTILITIES POLICY JOURNAL - CALL FOR PAPERS
FLORENCE SCHOOL SPECIAL ISSUE ON REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURES
(OFFICIAL CALL AVAILABLE ON THE PUBLISHER’S WEBSITE)
ABSTRACT
The de- and re-regulation of the different network industries is an ongoing process at the global level. As this 
process unfolds, ever new phenomena emerge, which generally call for more, rather than less regulatory 
intervention. Yet, the question about the right mixture between market, economic, technical and social regu-
lation remains widely open in all the network industries.
The question becomes even more challenging when looking at infrastructure development in the different 
regions of the world. While most of the European countries have a long lasting story of national regulation 
and have then started to put considerable effort in harmonising their regulation at the EU level, outside of the 
EU, regulation of different network industries has followed different paths.
This Florence School special issue gathers contributions to the 4th Florence Conference on the Regulation of 
Infrastructures and aims at taking stock of the major challenges infrastructure regulation is currently facing 
all over the world, with a special focus also on emerging countries. Due to impossibility for many to partici-
pate in the Conference, papers that have not been presented at the Conference will also be considered for 
publication. 
TOPICS COVERED
Areas of interest include, but are not limited to:
• Issues relevant in the main infrastructure sectors, notably telecommunications, postal services, electricity, 
gas, railways, air transport, urban public transport, as well as water distribution and sanitation; 
• Issues that are tackled from various disciplinary approaches, notably engineering, economics, law and poli-
tical science; interdisciplinary approaches are particularly encouraged;
• Case studies that are linking an academic approach to practical relevance; policy relevant research papers 
are particularly welcomed;
• We are especially looking for papers that link technology and institutions in developing and emerging 
countries.
GUEST EDITOR
Prof. Matthias Finger 
École polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne – Chair Management of Network Industries; European University 
Institute – Transport Area of the Florence School of Regulation 
NOTES FOR PROSPECTIVE AUTHORS
Submission of an article implies that such work has not been previously published nor is currently under 
consideration for publication elsewhere, and that its publication is approved by all authors. All papers will be 
peer-reviewed. A guide for authors, sample copies and other relevant information for submitting papers are 
available on the “Author Guidelines” page.
SUBMISSION GUIDELINES
All papers must be submitted through the Utilities Policy website: http://ees.elsevier.com/juip/   
When submitting the manuscript, please select “SI: Regulating Infrastructures” when you reach the “Article 
Type” step.  
Please inform the Guest Editor about your submission to the following contacts: Special Issue’s Guest Editor, 
Prof Matthias Finger, at Matthias.Finger@epfl.ch, and Florence School of Regulation’s Research Associate, Ms 
Nadia Bert, at FSR.Transport@eui.eu.
IMPORTANT DATES
• First Submission Date: 15 October 2015
• Notification of acceptance and comments by Guest Editor: 15 March 2016
• Revision process and notification of full paper acceptance due: 15 August 2016
• Publication of the accepted paper: November 2016
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The Transport Area of the Florence School of Regulation
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) has been created in 2004 as a partnership between the European 
University Institute (EUI) and the Council of the European Energy Regulators (CEER). Since then, the Florence 
School of Regulation has expanded from Energy regulation to Telecommunications and Media (2009), Trans-
port (2010) and Water (2014).
The Transport Area of the Florence School of Regulation (FSR Transport) is concerned with the regulation of 
all the transport modes and transport markets (including the relationship among them). It currently focuses 
on regulation and regulatory policies in railways, air transport, urban public transport, intermodal transport, 
as well as postal and delivery services.
The aim of FSR Transport is:
• to freely discuss topics of concern to regulated firms, regulators and the European Commission by way of 
stakeholder workshops;
• to involve all the relevant stakeholders in such discussions; and
• to actively contribute to the evolution of European regulatory policy by way of research.
The core activity of FSR Transport is the organization of policy events, where representatives of the European 
Commission, regulatory authorities, operators, other stakeholders, as well as academics in the field meet to 
shape regulatory policy in matters of European transport.
The results of FSR Transport’s activities are disseminated by way of policy briefs, working papers and acade-
mic publications. All FSR Transport materials are open source and available on the FSR Transport webpage, as 
they aim to involve professors, young academics and practitioners to become part of a unique open platform 
for applied research. 
To learn more visit our website: www.florence-school.eu or contact us at FSR.Transport@eui.eu.
Latest event:
Date Title
18 September 2015 7th Florence Air Forum
19 October 2015 6th Florence Urban Forum
 27 November 2015 11th Florence Rail Forum
For more information about our activities please contact: FSR.Transport@eui.eu.
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4th Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures
The de- and re-regulation of the different network industries is an ongoing process 
at the global level. As this process unfolds, ever new phenomena emerge, which 
generally call for more, rather than less regulatory intervention. Yet, the question 
about the right mixture between market, economic, technical and social regulation 
remains wide open in all the network industries. 
Continuing the successful format, the 4th Conference on the Regulation of Infras-
tructures took place on Friday, 12th June and brought together all research areas of 
the Florence School of Regulation to discuss current challenges in the regulation of 
the Infrastructure Industries.
FSR-Transport events Fall 2015: 
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